{"uid":"cap_awfm8qYKKEwHCB0Ykqn9E","slug":"negotiator402-vickrey-auction-bid-optimizer-e1343625","name":"negotiator402 – Vickrey Auction Bid Optimizer","description":"Self-evolving strategic reasoning agent — agent-native, pay-per-call: solve 2-player normal-form games (pure & mixed Nash equilibria), formulate plain-language 2-party negotiations into payoff matrices and solve them, and compute optimal second-price/Vickrey auction bids. Unlike a raw LLM endpoint, every answer carries a `verified` trust flag — `verified:true` means a deterministic solver (nashpy / closed-form) computed and confirmed the result, NOT a language model. The formulator layer self-improves training-free from production traffic: every formulation is logged, solver-verified outcomes become reward signals, and the underlying LoRA model is periodically retrained (SFT + RLVR) on its own verified history. No API key, no subscription — agents pay per request via x402 (Base/USDC) or MPP (Tempo/pathUSD).","url":"https://negotiator402.alogos.xyz/v1/bid","method":"POST","headers":{},"bodySchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"reserve":{"type":"number","description":"Optional reserve price."},"opponents":{"type":"array","description":"Single-bidder mode: opponents' valuations (or bid estimates)."},"valuation":{"type":"number","description":"Single-bidder mode: your own private valuation."},"valuations":{"type":"array","description":"Full-outcome mode: every bidder's private valuation."}}},"responseSchema":{"type":"object","required":["verified"],"properties":{"solver":{"type":"string"},"verified":{"enum":["true","false","refused"],"type":"string"},"mechanism":{"type":"string"},"explanation":{"type":"string"}},"additionalProperties":true},"example":null,"exampleRequest":null,"tags":["x402"],"displayCostAmount":"0.25","displayCostAsset":"USDC","priceDynamic":false,"priceHint":null,"priceStatus":"priced","priceSource":"probe","requiresHandshake":false,"reviewCount":0,"rating":{"score":"0.00","successRate":"0.00","reviews":0,"stars":null,"state":"unrated"},"availabilityStatus":"unknown","priceObserved":null,"sessionDeposit":null,"pricing":{"kind":"static","summary":"$0.25/call","primary":{"kind":"static","protocol":"x402","network":"base","amountUsd":"0.25","per":"call","confidence":"exact"},"accepted":[{"kind":"static","protocol":"x402","network":"base","amountUsd":"0.25","per":"call","confidence":"exact"}]},"paymentMethods":[{"uid":"pm__Kkm_h4Z8pbTM9A0Ru7g0","protocol":"x402","methodType":"crypto","chain":"base","mode":"charge","costAmount":"0.25","costPer":"request","priority":0,"asset":"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913","unit":"request","depositMicros":null,"planRef":null}],"brandName":null,"brandSlug":null,"brandBaseUrl":null,"brandDocsUrl":null,"whatItDoes":"Computes the optimal bid for a second-price (Vickrey) auction given a bidder's private valuation, opponent valuations, and an optional reserve price, with a deterministic solver-verified result.","exampleAgentPrompt":"I'm in a second-price sealed-bid auction where my private valuation is $450, I think my two opponents' valuations are around $300 and $380, and there's a reserve price of $200 — what's my optimal bid, and can you verify it with a deterministic solver?","exampleUseCases":null,"resultDescription":"Returns a JSON object with the optimal bid or auction outcome, the mechanism type (e.g. 'vickrey'), a plain-language explanation of the reasoning, the solver used, and a `verified` flag ('true' if a deterministic solver confirmed the result, 'false' if not, 'refused' if computation was not possible).","failureModes":["Missing required valuation fields returns an error with no bid computed","Invalid data types (non-numeric valuations) cause a rejection","Reserve price higher than all valuations may result in no sale outcome","verified:'refused' returned when inputs are ambiguous or outside solver scope","Payment failure via x402/MPP results in 402 error and no computation performed"],"whenToPreferThis":"Choose this endpoint when you need a deterministic, solver-verified optimal bid for a second-price (Vickrey) auction — not an LLM guess. Prefer it over general-purpose LLMs when auditability and the `verified:true` flag matter, or when you need game-theoretically exact results backed by closed-form computation. Also uniquely suited for pay-per-call agent workflows with no subscription required.","instructions":null,"reviewSummary":null,"reviewSummaryHighlights":null,"reviewSummaryConcerns":null,"reviewSummaryGeneratedAt":null,"activationCount":0,"lastUsedAt":null,"lastSuccessfullyRanAt":null,"lastHealthCheckAt":"2026-09-15T06:31:54.025Z","isFirstParty":false}